Silencing Palestinians with Reconciliation on the Table
Part 6 of the “Quiet Abandonment” series on the world’s retreat from the Palestinian cause. Part 1 of “Silenced Palestinian Voices.”
People often ask: If the Arab world wanted a Palestinian state so badly, why did they not establish one between 1948 and 1967, when Egypt controlled Gaza and Jordan controlled the West Bank*?
The common answer is usually, “They did not want one. They used the refugees as pawns in their ongoing war against Israel.”
* A note about terminology: Since this is an article about Palestinian Arab voices I am using their terminology and not inviting a political/diplomatic debate about them.
This oversimplifies the outcome of the power vacuum that emerged in 1948 and the resultant little-known clash between two rival visions: the All-Palestine Government (APG) in Gaza, and the Jericho Conference in the West Bank. One tried to assert Palestinian independence; the other handed the West Bank to Jordan. The winner was certainly not the people of Palestine.
The Shift from Bilād al-Shām to Filastin
Before 1948, many Arabs in this region did not even speak of "Palestine" as a separate national unit. The land was part of Bilād al-Shām — Greater Syria — a cultural region stretching from Aleppo down to Aqaba. In Ottoman administrative discourse, the Eastern Arab provinces were known inclusively as Şam-ı Şerif (the sacred region of Bilād al-Shām), while Filastin remained "a non-administrative designation for the mutasarriflik of Jerusalem and its northern expanses." People often called themselves Shāmīs, Levantines, rather than Palestinians.
Yet even in Ottoman times, the relationship was complex. As one Ottoman war report declared in 1915: "Palestine is the sister of Syria" — acknowledging both connection and distinction.
That began to change in the late Ottoman years, when local newspapers like Filastin (founded in Jaffa in 1911) used the word Filastin more deliberately.
Yet identity remained fluid. Some Arabs argued that Palestine should be absorbed into a greater Syrian state, reviving the Bilād al-Shām frame. Others, especially in Jaffa and Jerusalem, began to emphasize a distinct Palestinian nationhood. When Faisal's "Greater Syria" project collapsed in 1920, and when Jordan was created in 1921, the debate shifted: Was Palestine part of Syria, part of Jordan, or something separate altogether?
By 1948, after the Nakba and dispersal, "Palestinian" had become an unavoidable marker. It was no longer only a geographic label but carried political weight, a claim to peoplehood that Palestinians would hold onto, argue over, and fight to define for themselves rather than have imposed by others.
The All-Palestine Government: A Bid for Sovereignty
In Gaza in September 1948, the Arab League headed by Hajj Amin al-Husseini, under Egyptian sponsorship, announced the creation of the All-Palestine Government (APG). The APG proclaimed Palestinian independence over all of former Mandatory Palestine with Jerusalem as its capital, adopting the flag of the 1916 Arab Revolt.
The move aimed to unite Palestinians against Jordan’s ambitions to absorb Judea and Samaria, soon renamed the West Bank. The APG quickly issued passports, designed a constitution, and appointed ministers, showing that Palestinians should decide their own fate, not Cairo, Amman, or any other Arab capital.
However, Egypt prohibited an APG military, instead placing all Palestinian fighters under Egyptian command and it limited APG administrative operations to the point of requiring Egyptian approval for even routine decisions. When the APG sought to relocate to Jerusalem or West Bank, Egypt forced it to remain in Gaza under Egyptian oversight. By the mid 1950s, the APG rarely convened and its president and ministers were essentially political exiles in Cairo. Palestinian political organizations were suppressed by Nasser who in 1959, dissolved the APG and assumed full military occupation of Gaza in order to hold together the Arab League and maintain Egypt’s position in it.
The Gaza conference represented a coalition of Palestinian notables, political parties, and civic leaders who sought sovereignty for over 30 years. And it was brought down by Arab states whose interests conflicted with those of the Palestinian Arabs, especially Egypt who had used it as a prop against Jordanian expansionism.
The Jericho Conference: Annexation in the Guise of Representation
In December 1948, three months later after the APG was founded , another meeting was convened, this time in Jericho. Presented as a gathering of Palestinian notables, it was in fact orchestrated by King Abdullah I of Transjordan with the goal of endorsing the annexation of the West Bank to his kingdom.
The Jericho Conference has often been cited as proof that West Bank Palestinians supported union with Jordan. This is misleading. Attendance was selective. Many cities, including Nablus, Hebron, and Bethlehem, were represented by figures loyal to the Hashemite cause, not by elected delegates or broad civic bodies. Sheikh Muhammad Ali al-Ja‘bari, for example, was appointed mayor of Hebron by the king.
Palestinian political figures associated with the APG or critical of Abdullah boycotted the event or were excluded. Musa Alami, a prominent Palestinian nationalist and Emil Ghouri, secretary of the Arab Higher Committee refused to attend and another Arab nationalist leader, Awni Abd al-Hadi, was excluded because of his criticism of the Hashemites.
Following the Convention, opposition voices, such as Hajj Amin al-Husseini and Raghib al-Nashashibi, were sidelined because they declared the Conference a betrayal of Palestinian independence.
Two resolutions that would have asserted a distinct Palestinian identity were proposed but never passed. These were:
Proposal for an Independent Palestinian State under the All-Palestine Government
"To declare forthwith the independence of all Palestine, with Jerusalem as its capital, under the authority of the All-Palestine Government formed in Gaza, and to call upon all Arab states to recognize and assist it."
Rejected after Jordanian officials and pro-Hashemite delegates argued it would weaken Arab unity and delay “liberation” of the rest of Palestine.
Proposal for a General Palestinian Congress Before Any Decision on Union with Jordan
"To convene, at the earliest possible date, a general Palestinian congress representing all districts of Palestine — including Gaza, the West Bank, and refugee communities — to determine freely the political future of the country."
Rejected on grounds that wartime conditions made such a gathering “impractical” and that King Abdullah’s leadership offered the most immediate protection.
With these rejected, the conference passed the following four resolutions. The most important of which gave Jordan a mandate to annex the territory:
Request for Union with Jordan
To request His Majesty King Abdullah to annex the Arab part of Palestine on the western bank of the Jordan River to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and grant its inhabitants full Jordanian citizenship.
Support for King Abdullah’s Role in the Liberation of Palestine
To affirm loyalty to King Abdullah and support his leadership in working for the liberation of the remainder of Palestine from Zionist control.
Call for the Return of Refugees
To demand the immediate return of Palestinian Arab refugees to their homes and the restitution of their property.
Guarantee of Rights
To ensure that, upon union with Jordan, the people of the West Bank would enjoy full political rights, representation, and equality with East Bank citizens.
These last two resolutions were seen as symbolic clauses designed to present the union with Jordan as both "voluntary and protective of Palestinian rights".
The international reaction to the annexation was mixed. The Arab League condemned the conference and declared the annexation a temporary measure. The Syrian and Lebanese press condemned the event as a British-backed ploy to expand Jordan. King Abdullah ignored the condemnation, and the West Bank was formally annexed on 24 April 1950. Only the United Kingdom and Pakistan formally recognized the annexation, with the U.S. offering de facto recognition.
The Voices of 1948: Opening a new subseries of articles
The APG and the Jericho Conference embodied opposing principles. The Gaza initiative, flawed and politically constrained though it was, emerged from Palestinian actors asserting a national identity distinct from any Arab state. The Jericho gathering, in contrast, was orchestrated by an external power to serve its own strategic needs, bypassing genuine Palestinian consent.
The popular narrative that “Palestinians chose union with Jordan” rests heavily on Jericho. This ignores who was in the room, who was not, and what was refused before the votes were taken.
Why This Matters
These events show how Palestinian political will was subverted by regional powers. Between 1948 and 1967, the absence of a Palestinian state was the outcome of deliberate Arab policies that preferred to divide the land between themselves rather than empower an independent Palestine.
Then, with Israel’s victory in the 1967 Six-Day War, the ground beneath the Palestinians and their neighbours shook, upsetting their fragile equilibrium. Now, the same Egypt and Jordan that had stymied Palestinian independence cried out for it, and the war against the Jewish state took on a new face. The Arab-Israel conflict was renamed the Palestinian-Israel conflict.
I show in the first half of the Quiet Abandonment series, how Egypt, Jordan, the Gulf states, the USA, and Europe push the idea of a two-state-solution as the road to peace while resisting the actual establishment of a viable state.
In this Palestinian Voices subseries, I want to let Palestinians speak for themselves, not filter their words through outside commentators. While the present opening article relies on historical analysis rather than direct Palestinian testimony, it establishes the pattern of silenced voices that the following articles will address through contemporary Palestinian perspectives. The challenge will be in gaining access to voices from the street, something that will be limited because of fear. All I can promise is to do my best.
These articles will not try to force a single conclusion or make political statements. They are an invitation to read Palestinian politics in Palestinian terms, to see where public sentiment and leadership align or collide, and to understand what Palestinians themselves think and want rather than validating any particular political position. What I find might correspond to my personal preferences and it might not. This is an opening gambit that asks whether decades of diplomacy have been built on a false reading of the record, and I hope others will continue from the point at which I complete my present exploration.
Sources Used in this Article
Caldwell, Johanna, 1990: Inter-Arab Rivalry and the All-Palestine Government of 1948.
Martin, A., & Cherif, N., 2021: The Egyptian Policy towards Palestine from 1949 to 1956.
Shlaim, Avi, 1990: The Rise and Fall of the All-Palestine Government in Gaza
Tamari, Salim, 2016: Chapter 2, “Muhammad Kurd Ali and the Syrian-Palestinian intelligentsia in the Ottoman campaign against Arab separatism” (in the book, Syria in World War I - Politics, Economy, and Society). See pages 39-42.
The Jewish Virtual Library: The Jericho Conference on Palestine-Jordan Unity
U.S. Office of the Historian, 1948: Letter from Mr. Wells Stabler to the Acting Secretary of State
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The Palestinian cause certainly was sidelined by Egypt, Jordan and the Gulf States. And clearly they changed views in 1967 as a politically expedient maneuver. They never believed in the Palestinian cause. This is an interesting counter narrative to the prevailing one. Thank you for resurrecting this history.
Thanks for the excellent history lesson!