Silenced Palestinian Voices V: Gaza and the West Bank – One People? Really?

Part 10 of the “Quiet Abandonment” series on the world’s retreat from the Palestinian cause. Part 5 of “Silenced Palestinian Voices.”

In the rhetoric of diplomacy, media coverage, and international resolutions, "the Palestinians" are often spoken of as a singular national unit: one people with one cause. But the lived reality tells a far more fractured story. The divide between Gaza and the West Bank is not simply political. It is geographic, historical, demographic, cultural, and ideological.

In 1948, Gaza came under Egyptian military rule, the West Bank was annexed by Jordan. The former became a refugee enclave, the latter remained rooted in ancient cities. The former is mainly Bedouin and Islamist, the latter Levantine and bureaucratic.

And yet, the myth of unity persists. Because the world requires it. And the leadership plays the assigned role. But beneath the flag that seems to unite them, the two populations have never walked the same path.

Gaza and the West Bank Were Never One

Before 1948, as everyone knows, there was no state called Palestine. Under the British Mandate, Gaza and Judea and Samaria were administered separately as districts. Prior to that, they were part of the Ottoman Empire's provincial system. In 1948, the division became more pronounced: Egypt took control of Gaza, while Jordan annexed Judea and Samaria and called it the West Bank, granting its residents Jordanian citizenship. Gazans who made their way to Jordan over the years were never granted citizenship in Jordan.

This meant different governments, legal systems, currencies, school systems, travel documents, and diplomatic statuses. Gaza and the West Bank were separated by Israeli territory and had no physical connection. They functioned more like nearby protectorates than provinces of a shared national project and evolved as two separate societies.

Refugees in Gaza vs. Residents in the West Bank

In 1947, Gaza had a population of about 80,000. By 1950, that number had tripled to over 240,000. Two-thirds of Gaza's population were refugees from southern Mandatory Palestine, from towns like Ashkelon (called Majdal in Arabic), Ashdod (called Isdud in Arabic), and Beersheba.

These refugees lived in overcrowded UNRWA camps and were denied Egyptian citizenship. Their identity was defined by dispossession and exile.

By contrast, the West Bank's population also increased after 1948, but less dramatically. Cities like Hebron, Nablus, and Ramallah continued to be populated by families who had lived there for generations, with about one-third of the population refugees, mainly from cities like Jaffa, Ramle, and Haifa. These refugees were more likely to be absorbed into urban life, and were given Jordanian citizenship.

This created two Palestinian populations: one defined by permanent displacement and grievance, the other anchored in politics and social integration.

While both territories have been economically intertwined with Israel in different ways, these demographic differences shaped distinct economic trajectories. After Oct 7^th, Gaza’s economy collapsed and that of the West Bank has declined but accurate data are not available. Relevant to our comparison, it is instrumental to compare the data available for the pre-Oct 7^th period.

Gaza's GDP per capita hovered around $800-1,000 annually, while the West Bank's reached $3,500-4,000. Gaza suffered unemployment rates of 46% overall and over 65% among youth, compared to the West Bank's 13-17%. However, this economic disparity reflects security policies rather than inherent differences. Before 2007, over 100,000 Gazans worked daily in Israel, similar to pre-Oct 7^th West Bank patterns, and just before Oct 7^th, 17000 Gazans worked in Israel.

The security restrictions implemented after Hamas's 2007 takeover transformed Gaza from an economically integrated territory into an aid-dependent enclave, while the West Bank maintained more consistent trade relationships and labour mobility. Both territories have been economically dependent on Israel, but Gaza's access was far more constrained due to security concerns over weapons smuggling and militant activities.

Cultural and Political Differences Took Root

Gaza's population, largely Bedouin and under Egyptian cultural influences, were so infused with desperation that their political culture developed on the bedrock of resistance and religiosity. The Gazan dialect, cuisine and even religious practices differ in subtle ways from the more Levantine, highland culture of the West Bank.

The rise of Hamas was no accident. Islamism offered a language of both grievance and social order.

The West Bank, under Jordanian administration, developed a more bureaucratic and secular nationalist political class. Fatah, the PLO, and eventually the Palestinian Authority emerged from that ecosystem. While the PA is authoritarian, its origins were in state-building, not Islamist resistance.

The Oslo Accords and the Illusion of Unity

The 1993 Oslo Accords proposed the formation of a single Palestinian Authority to govern both Gaza and the West Bank. For a moment, it seemed the myth of unity would become real.

But it was a facade. The political infrastructure remained divided. Rivalries persisted. When Hamas won the 2006 Parliamentary elections, the PA rejected their authority. In 2007, Hamas seized Gaza by force and the divide between the two geographic regions became institutionalized.

Hamas governs Gaza with an iron fist. The PA governs parts of the West Bank, propped up by foreign aid and Israeli security coordination. Each arrests members of the other's faction. Elections have been repeatedly postponed. Unity talks have failed. They are more like rival states than provinces of a single future nation.

The split is not just political. Children in Gaza and the West Bank are taught different curricula, are subject to different laws, and live under different political cultures.

While both territories officially use the same PA curriculum, for example, the educational experience has diverged since 2007. In Gaza, Hamas-run schools supplement the standard materials with additional worksheets and exercises emphasizing armed resistance and Islamic themes, reflecting Hamas' ideological priorities, even digging in further when schools reopened this year. These differences in implementation and informal educational practices mean that children in Gaza and the West Bank, despite using nominally the same textbooks, are receiving subtly different messages about their identity and future.

Naftali Bennett’s Stabilization Plan and the “Three-State” Idea

Former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett’s 2012 “Stabilization Plan” explicitly called for preventing any connection between Gaza and the West Bank. He described it as a way to contain the violence of Hamas and maintain Israeli security.

Under this vision, Israeli Law would be extended to Area C of the West Bank/Judea and Samaria, Areas A and B would remain under PA autonomy, and Gaza would be treated as an isolated, separate entity, effectively pushing it toward Egypt.

That plan was never formally considered, but it reflects a reality that some may grow to accept.

In 2015, Bassem Eid, himself a Palestinian refugee from Jerusalem, responded to a question on behalf of his fellow Palestinians:

I don’t think that the Palestinians believe in the two-state solution. Most Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank believe in a three-state solution: one state in Gaza, one state in the West Bank, and the state of Israel.

So Why the Myth of Unity?

If Gaza and the West Bank are so different, why does the world continue to speak of “the Palestinians” as a singular people?

Partly, it is political strategy depending on the performance of unity. Diplomats, NGOs, UN agencies, and media outlets need a single partner with whom to talk, a single population to support, a singular cause to endorse. The PLO popularized pan-Palestinian identity in the 1960s, blurring differences to build international legitimacy, and the refugee cause created a sense of shared grievance.

But grievance is not governance. And ideology is not identity. Today, the two Palestinian territories operate like separate countries with opposing leaderships, incompatible systems, and perhaps even diverging worldviews.

There are signs that the formerly mainly secular West Bank is becoming more conservative over the past decades and polls show that support for Hamas is growing even as it seems that war-weariness is draining support for Hamas in Gaza. While this may lead one to interpret the supposed blurring of ideological lines, it does not blur the cultural and societal distinctions that are grounded in clan membership and the differences between Bedouin Gaza and Levantine West Bank.

Conclusion: Two Flags Hidden in One

To speak of Gazans and West Bankers as one people is to mistake shared victimhood for shared nationhood. Their histories since 1948 have been radically different. And their political futures may be impossible to reconcile.

This is not just a fractured nation. It is a nation divided before it had a chance to be born.

We will see in the next two articles in this series whether or not there is a similarity in the voices silenced in these two regions given their unmistakable divergence from one another.