Israel Agreed to Build Gaza a Seaport. Then Hamas Took Power
The forgotten 2005 document that challenges the ‘open-air prison’ narrative
One of the most common claims made about Gaza is that Israel withdrew in 2005 only to turn it into an ‘open-air prison.’ This claim persists largely because a crucial piece of history has disappeared from public discussion.
In short:
Just two months after Israel completed its disengagement from Gaza, Israel and the Palestinian Authority reached an agreement, brokered by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, that would have seen Gaza taking an open and active part in world economic activities.
What I remembered from that time
I remember hearing that, after the disengagement, Gaza was supposed to have a seaport and perhaps even an airport. When I asked about this at a talk given by one of the architects of the withdrawal over a decade ago, the speaker dismissed the idea outright. I left the event wondering if I had remembered incorrectly.
I figured that someone involved in the withdrawal must know better than me. But the idea that Gaza was supposed to have a seaport and an airport niggled at me in the back of my head all these years.
Finding the document
All the accusations against Israel since Oct 7th finally impelled me to look for evidence: either I imagined it all or I remembered it correctly.
I found the agreement and have attached a PDF copy of the document at the end of this article.
Essentially, on 15 Nov 2005, Israel and the Palestinian Authority signed the Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA). It set out to improve the movement of people and goods following Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza while addressing Israel’s security concerns.
The commitments included: the Rafah crossing between Gaza and Egypt would operate under international supervision, crossings would be upgraded to facilitate Palestinian exports and imports, bus and truck convoys were to connect Gaza with the West Bank Palestinian Authority.
My memory of the construction of a seaport was affirmed. In addition, the importance of reopening Gaza’s airport was recognized and discussions on the security arrangements that would make that possible were to continue.
Taken together, these provisions describe an agreed framework for increasing Gaza’s connection to the outside world. Contemporary economic assessments anticipated that, if movement and access improved, Gaza would see rising employment, expanding agricultural and manufacturing exports, and a return to positive economic growth.
The AMA was explicitly conditioned on security cooperation. A UN report in anticipation of the Israeli disengagement makes that clear:
The [World] Bank’s June 23 [2004] paper observed that “a maximum PA effort to fulfill its security obligations under the Roadmap is needed if the donor community is to argue for a major easing of today’s closure regime.” . . . it is clear that a revival of the private sector will not take place in an environment plagued by conflict with Israel and by domestic lawlessness.
In late 2005, therefore, the expectation was that movement, trade, and economic development would expand if security measures were respected.
It is important to note that the disengagement did not end every form of Israeli control over Gaza. Israel retained control over airspace, maritime security, and certain external security functions. The AMA did not eliminate those arrangements. Rather, it sought to expand the movement of people and goods within that broader security framework.
The AMA should not be confused with what ultimately happened on the ground. It was an agreement that established a framework and a direction rather than a guarantee of outcomes. Several of its provisions were implemented only partially while others never progressed beyond the planning stage before the security situation deteriorated.
The short life of the Agreement on Movement and Access
Table 1 shows the timeline from the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza onward. The reasons for the disengagement itself are beyond the scope of this article and deserve separate treatment
The timeline also shows that implementation of the AMA encountered difficulties almost immediately. Some stemmed from continuing security incidents, while others reflected the practical challenges of carrying out a complex international agreement.
Table 1. Timeline from Disengagement to the Collapse of the AMA
2000-2005 Ongoing rocket attacks and other militant activity during the Second Intifada.
15 Aug -- 12 Sept 2005 Israel completes the unilateral disengagement from Gaza, evacuating about 8,000 civilian Jewish residents and removing all military installations from inside the Strip.
15 Nov 2005 Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA), with U.S. mediation, reach the Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA). The AMA calls for opening Rafah, improving commercial crossings, bus and truck convoys between Gaza and the West Bank, construction of a seaport, and discussions on reopening the airport.
25 Nov 2005 Rafah Crossing opens under the supervision of the European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM).
Late 2005 -- early 2006 Planning continues for other provisions, but implementation slows amid continuing Palestinian rocket attacks and growing political instability within Gaza. The Gaza-West Bank convoy system never begins. Work on the seaport does not start. Discussions about the airport do not progress.
25 Jan 2006 Hamas wins the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections, defeating Fatah. This dramatically changes the political environment in which the AMA was meant to operate.
18 Feb 2006 The newly elected PLC members are sworn in. Israel, the United States, and the European Union refuse to deal with a Hamas-led government unless it renounces violence, recognises Israel, and accepts previous agreements.
29 Mar 2006 Hamas cabinet sworn in, forming the new Palestinian government.
25 June 2006 After months of continued rocket fire from Gaza onto farms and towns in southern Israel, Hamas militants cross the border into Israel, kill two Israeli soldiers, and kidnap Gilad Shalit. Israel launches Operation Summer Rains.
26 June 2006 Israeli naval blockade and Rafah closure due to security alerts. EUBAM suspends operations. Rafah reopens intermittently throughout 2006, with closures influenced by both Israeli and Egyptian security coordination.
Summer -Autumn 2006 Remaining provisions of the AMA effectively stall.
9 June 2007 Egypt closes the Rafah crossing.
14 June 2007 Hamas violently seizes control of Gaza from the PA after several days of fighting, including throwing PA representatives off building roofs. Hamas now controls Gaza; Fatah controls the West Bank PA.
June 2007 onward Israel and Egypt impose tighter border restrictions on Gaza as the assumptions on which the AMA had been negotiated are no longer compatible with the security needs of either. The AMA is overtaken by events and the seaport and airport projects disappear from the diplomatic agenda.
Note that even before the January 2006 election, implementation was already strained because of ongoing rocket fire from Gaza into southern Israel. Furthermore, Rafah did not close permanently in June 2006 but only one year later. Egypt’s bilateral security role was an essential part of the AMA and they closed the Rafah crossing to prevent weapons smuggling and Hamas and Muslim Brotherhood activities in Sinai.
History moves forward and not backward. The missed opportunities of 2005-2006 cannot be revived. And there is no way of knowing if Gaza would have succeeded in becoming the fantasied “Singapore of the Mediterranean.”
In any case, that is not the question today. After Oct 7th, there is no going back. Decades of trust-building through re-education of the population would have to take place for Israel to leave Gaza again, if ever.
The importance of remembering the Agreement on Movement and Access today
The AMA demonstrates that the immediate post-disengagement vision was not one of the permanent isolation of Gaza, but, rather, the integration of Gaza within the global economy.
To understand the conflict today, to understand the blockade on land and sea, the path that was originally laid out and why it was abandoned have to be part of the discussion.
P.S. As I was researching the Agreement on Movement and Access, I was struck by how similar its underlying logic is to that of the recent Israel-Lebanon agreement. Both rest on the same premise: security first, followed by greater freedom of movement and economic development. Whether the newer agreement will fare better than the AMA remains to be seen.
You forgot to mention that Gaza also had an international airport in 1998.
https://youtu.be/vYodi28td20?si=W78YUZoyvwqePCVK
https://english.wafa.ps/Pages/Details/96404
Sheri, Another homerun. Thanks for shared such a clear pictural history lesson. Like others have said, the blind will still not see the truth you share but us open-minded folks can be better informed and enlightened.
THANKS AND GOD BLESS!!