Diplomacy’s Denial: America and the Peace Process That Is Not
Part 4 of the 'Quiet Abandonment' series on the world's retreat from the Palestinian cause.
American leaders still talk about a two-state solution. But behind the podium, they are managing a conflict they have no intention of resolving, quietly ensuring that Palestinian statehood never materializes.
Some American officials genuinely believe in a two-state solution. John Kerry’s 2013–2014 diplomacy exemplified this: he pursued bold U.S.-brokered talks under the premise that serious, time-bound negotiations could deliver peace. Even after their collapse, Kerry reiterated his conviction that
… the only way … to have a Jewish state and two nations … living side by side in peace … is through a two-state solution.
While proponents still contend that a viable Palestinian state would provide Israeli security and long-term regional stability, the actions of the U.S. diplomatic machine reveal that this is more public justification than policy driver for a process that America has, in practice, quietly abandoned.
The Spectrum of American Belief
American officials fall into roughly four categories regarding Palestinian statehood: True believers like Kerry who genuinely pursue statehood despite repeated failures; pragmatic skeptics who maintain the framework for strategic reasons while privately doubting its viability; cynical actors who use two-state rhetoric purely as political cover; and those who no longer think it possible or even desirable. Understanding this spectrum helps explain why the old script persists even as belief erodes across the policy establishment.
For Israelis, October 7th was a turning point. For Americans, it was a polarizer rather than a pivot, reinforcing existing positions without fundamentally altering the institutional commitment to process over outcome.
The Performance of Support
This evolving landscape of belief becomes clear when examining official responses to recent developments. When Israel's Knesset voted in July 2024 to formally reject a Palestinian state, many Israelis were relieved. Washington’s response was strikingly routine. During his tenure, Secretary of State Blinken, for example, repeated expressed unwavering commitment to a two-state solution in nearly every speech and briefing, often without acknowledging Israel’s growing opposition or the history of Palestinian rejections of previous statehood offers.
This diplomatic theatre follows familiar choreography: statements without accountability or meaningful policy shifts. The Trump administration, conversely, is open about viewing the two-state solution as no longer viable.
The roots of this performative diplomacy trace back to Oslo itself. Never creating a path to peace, the Accords created a framework for managing a conflict no one knew how to end. Former U.S. Ambassador Daniel Kurtzer called the Accords “asymmetrical,” arguing that they weakened Palestinian institutions without placing binding obligations on Israel.
The Oslo Accords were not a peace agreement but a transitional framework. Signed in the 1990s, they created the Palestinian Authority and gave it five years to build the institutions of statehood, followed by final status negotiations. That deadline passed in 1999. More than two decades later, the basic infrastructure for a state still does not exist. Yet the Oslo framework endures, propped up by bureaucratic inertia, diplomatic theater, and the political costs of admitting its failure.
Congressional Rhetoric vs. Reality
The pattern of performative support extends beyond executive diplomacy to legislative action. American lawmakers signal support for peace while funding policies ensuring it never happens. Under bipartisan agreement, U.S. military aid to Israel remains firm at $3.8 billion annually. This guarantees Israel’s strategic superiority with no comparable leverage used to advance Palestinian sovereignty.
To some, the two-state solution is rhetorical cover. Trump’s pick for Secretary of Defence, Pete Hegseth, dismissed it as “lip service,” and former Democratic Rep. Jamaal Bowman cynically quipped that it is “the thing you say so that everyone leaves you alone.”
When AIPAC removed official references to the two-state solution from its talking points in 2023, while still claiming support, it reinforced the impression of rhetorical posturing.
Senator Chuck Schumer regularly affirms support for a two-state solution while voting for unconditional military support to Israel. This common Democratic pattern avoids accusations of being soft on terror while maintaining rhetorical commitment to Palestinian rights. Even those most vocal about Israeli abuses often offer no viable vision for what Palestinian sovereignty would look like.
President Trump, for his part, openly rejected Palestinian statehood, from his 2017 embassy relocation to his 2025 dismissal of European recognition efforts as “rewarding Hamas.” That stance now shapes Republican policy.
Diplomacy as Process, not Product
Beyond domestic politics, the State Department has become structurally invested in maintaining the illusion of process. Oslo gives America privileged access to all sides. As long as talks remain theoretically possible, the U.S. maintains its indispensable mediator role. Washington’s mediator status enabled deals like the Abraham Accords, which unlinked Arab normalisation from Palestinian statehood. By 2023, UAE–Israel trade alone had topped $10 billion, a tangible benefit of bypassing the Oslo roadmap while appearing not to.
The institutional commitment runs deep. Openly abandoning Oslo would require admitting the failure of Camp David and Kerry's talks, damaging U.S. credibility. The diplomatic establishment is unwilling to absorb this blow. Nor is it willing to risk leaving Middle East diplomacy to others, particularly China.
Entire careers and policy portfolios depend on Oslo remaining the framework. The State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs has long devoted significant staffing and resources to Israeli–Palestinian affairs. Even when the Trump administration cut aid and shuttered the USAID mission in Jerusalem in 2019, the underlying infrastructure remained. Under Biden, USAID resumed operations and restored $293 million by 2023, reaffirming bureaucratic commitment to this framework. However, it focused on service delivery rather than building the infrastructure for independence, which will be covered in detail in a later article in this series.
The Case for Maintaining the Framework
Given this institutional investment, defenders of the current approach argue it serves legitimate purposes beyond mere performance. Maintaining the two-state framework, they contend, prevents worse outcomes: complete abandonment could trigger regional instability, eliminate America's mediating role, or push Palestinians toward more extreme alternatives. The process, however flawed, preserves hope and prevents despair-driven radicalisation.
Yet this defensive logic increasingly resembles justifications that were used for failed policies in Vietnam or Afghanistan. Critics might ask: Isn't hope without genuine prospects counterproductive?
Evidence of Quiet Abandonment
Democratic leaders still speak of the two-state solution while their priorities reveal quiet abandonment. Biden’s administration appointed Hady Amr as Washington-based Special Representative for Palestinian-Israeli Affairs in November 2022. But Amr was tasked with coordinating humanitarian aid and delivering economic reform assistance, not mediating peace talks or advancing statehood. His mandate underscores that the U.S. remains invested in managing, not resolving, the conflict.
Trump's 2020 "Vision for Peace" proposed a demilitarized pseudo-state under Israeli control while calling it a "two-state solution." Rejected by Palestinians as formalizing apartheid, the plan prioritized Israeli security and U.S. strategic leverage, logic later echoed in the Abraham Accords.
Today, the U.S. increasingly ties statehood to Palestinian Authority reform such that demands for a non-corrupt PA become a way to indefinitely postpone resolution. This conditionality conveniently aligns with Israeli preferences: it defers the risks of Palestinian sovereignty while preserving the diplomatic calm and international funding that benefit the current status quo.
Why a Palestinian State Threatens American Interests
Palestinian statehood could genuinely harm core American interests. Even liberal commentators like Salman Rushdie warn about unintended consequences:
If there were a Palestinian state now, it would be run by Hamas and we would have a Taliban-like state. A satellite state of Iran. Is this what the progressive movements want to create?
Israel provides the U.S. with unmatched intelligence, counterterrorism collaboration, military R&D, and a strategic foothold in the Middle East. A Hamas-led or Iranian-allied Palestinian state, could jeopardize these benefits and create new security challenges.
Trump’s controversial “Riviera of the Middle East” vision — complete with an AI-generated promotional video and mass population transfer — reveals the extent to which policymakers may prefer any alternative, however implausible, to a Palestinian state governed by Hamas.
The Institutionalized Performance
Whether from strategic caution or institutional inertia, the U.S. now sustains a diplomatic framework not because it leads anywhere, but because it avoids accountability, maintains influence, and satisfies both domestic and international needs.
American leaders, therefore, may still say “Palestinian state,” but everything in their behaviour says: “not really.”
NEXT: European leaders trapped in their own moral diplomatic theatre
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A two-state solution is a blatant utopia.
Former President Bill Clinton recently acknowledged this clearly in a speech.
If an Arab state were to emerge in Judea and Samaria, it would be suicide for Israel.
In Western countries, a two-state solution is being demanded. Naive and unrealistic. Remember, there is no Islamic democracy anywhere in the world.
It's hard to imagine what the Palestinians could do that is more extreme than 7 October. And a real desire for a Palestinian state from the Americans should have included more pressure for an end to terrorism and "pay to slay" as well as an end to Fatah kleptocracy.
The moderate left holds on to Oslo as a religious belief about human perfectibility and the sanctity of negotiation, not a realistic policy model. Sadly, no one other than Trump has been motivated to find an alternative.